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docs/evidence/app-settings-service-component-2026-11-06.mdView source ↗

English source · 3 min

Independent encrypted App settings acceptance, 6 November 2026

Source: Apps 0.27.0 at 5e24268e52969d5436d98ee2f62c34dee3534e3d, Data service 0.3.0 and authority 0.2.0. Source change. Operator setup and JavaScript example.

Delivered operation

POST /v1/settings/read, POST /v1/settings/save, MCP apps.settings.read/save, OpenAPI and the existing generic SDK use shared declared settings orchestration. src/settings.rs retains the native partial update/projection and encrypted revision/package-bound storage, with one metadata-only outbox transaction. Native routes call that owner while retaining their original verified personal administrator admission, live-stage restriction and package approval.

authority/vault contains the original platform AES-GCM envelope. Cognition retains operator environment/key loading, with a vault-only declared dependency. The Cargo boundary checker now classifies authority explicitly and has 36 bypass negative controls, including accidental OAuth/database features in that dependency. The shared storage library still owns no pool, environment or current identity.

The independent profile requires schema 3, explicit restricted grants and an operator vault key. Its fresh fixed OAuth authority must assert nondelegatable personal/live claims and current apps.read/apps.manage/team.manage. The migration adds one fixed secret table and native package digest registration, never per-App/model/shop SQL objects. The serving process cannot install or approve packages, change schemas, export secrets or acquire migration authority.

Actual independent process and container

The existing data-service/tests/acceptance.py now includes settings_cases.py and executable examples/settings.mjs. It runs the actual Rust service, PostgreSQL, fixed identity endpoint and unchanged SDK, without Core:

  • Reader/write profiles hide and reject settings; schema/grant mismatch rejects startup.
  • Missing current administrator scopes, personal/live claims, merchant context or a bootstrap subject deny both reads and writes. Request tenant fields reject.
  • Two tenants have independent configuration; their secret values never appear in settings reads, events or ciphertext text.
  • Required settings, unknown fields/types, false approval and missing trusted digest registration reject. Empty strings, false, zero and omitted secrets retain their original semantics.
  • Concurrent same-revision writes yield one success and one 409. Late outbox failure rolls back ciphertext, revision and event together.
  • Package change hides old configuration and requires new explicit configuration; old secrets do not silently inherit. Deactivation blocks access.
  • The actual serving login cannot edit package digest/identity or delete settings.
  • MCP and Fetch agree with the unchanged SDK; wrong vault key or ciphertext from another tenant denies. Configuration survives process reconnect.

Component CI passes storage, runtime, service and data-reader jobs. The actual Data container repeats the same PostgreSQL/HTTP/MCP/SDK workflow with nonroot user 10001, a read-only root filesystem, no capabilities and no new privileges. It contains no Python, Cargo or psql. The unchanged Runtime container also passes.

Assembled native Veyndo

The actual rebuilt binary passes apps, app_studio, tenant_isolation and app_shared_storage using separately authenticated system and tenant logins with strict signed SQL scope. The existing adversarial verifier rejects foreign, system and personal scope forgery and privileged schema/identity access.

The original app_surfaces and app_secrets HTTP/provider fixtures also pass, including encrypted settings on real installed App surfaces, secret-safe reads, partial updates, current foreign/restricted actor denials, actual private service configuration injection, sandbox exclusion, credential rotation and webhook signatures. These use local synthetic providers and their own temporary database.

Workspace/all-target Clippy, 74 actual App unit tests, the native encryption unit, authority vault interoperability and original shared PostgreSQL storage contracts pass. Existing Lean production policies and their negative controls retain their named scope; no proof of encryption, OAuth, SQL or complete host correctness is claimed. Structure, localization and source ownership checks pass.

Remaining component work

APP-02c is complete for this explicit installed-App settings profile. Full trusted installation, transport-secret rotation, internal runtime setting resolution, jobs, native resource policies, restore and standalone publication remain on APP-02..05. No public Data service, production schema upgrade or production vault key was provisioned in this acceptance. Existing native databases need no schema or ciphertext conversion for the shared-code change.